HEROES
The following abbreviations are used in this story:
(RCCP) Pilot
(RCCP) Co-Pilot
(FE) Crewchief/Flight Engineer
(PJ) Pararescue
The Rescue of DAVID27
EDITORS NOTE: During the night of 24/25 November 1967, the Regional Force (RF) Outpost of Nam Can was hit by over 100 rounds of mortar fire wounding numerous personnel.
Nam Can is an isolated outpost at the extreme southern tip of Vietnam, surrounded on all sides by the tripled canopied Nam Can Forest and located 30 miles south of Ca Mau, the Capital of An Xuyen Province.
At first light on 25 November, (P) USAF Capt. Charles J. Louvorn Call sign David27 along with his passenger USMC LtC Ted Culpepper the An Xuyen Province Senior Advisor flew to Nam Can to try and locate the mortar positions bombarding the fort.
As the O1F Birddog attempted a visual reconnaissance of the area, the engine was hit by ground fire severing an oil line. Knowing there was only a few minutes of flying time before the engine seized, Capt. Louvorn elected to try a forced landing near the fort on the helicopter landing pad. During the landing, the little Cessna flipped on its back, but both occupants crawled out with little more than bumps and bruises.
The Commander of the Viet Cong Battalion* decided that the stranded American Pilot was a worthwhile prize and pressed the attack.
* Later intelligence sources would reveal that a traitor inside the fort informed the VC of the identities of both the Pilot and Passenger.
(P) Major Chester A. Wallborn - DAVID30; I was flying in the Bac Lieu Province when I was advised that a FAC was down in the Nam Can area. I flew to Ca Mau, refueled, and took off enroute to Nam Can. About 10 minutes prior to landing at Ca Mau I had requested two flights of F-100 aircraft with M117 bombs, rockets, CBU’s and 20mm to suppress what I was sure would be heavy AAA fire. I also expected a simultaneous mortar attack on the outpost as soon as the helicopter touched down on the helipad.
Meanwhile, the Joint Service Rescue Center (JSRC) in Saigon had contacted DET10 38ARRS at Binh Thuy AB and Pedro91 an HH-43F had been scrambled. A second HH-43F Pedro39 would launch ten minutes later.
DAVID30; I was working with PLAYBOY Control when I was put in contact first with Pedro91, then with Pedro39, two USAF Rescue Helicopters that had launched from Binh Thuy Air Base.
Pedro39 races to catch up
Pedro91, flown by Captain Larry Conover, was low on fuel and I directed that he land at Ca Mau to refuel prior to proceeding to Nam Can.
Capt. Larry Conover (RCP) Pedro91; It was a long flight and we were low on fuel. After a discussion with DAVID30 we elected to stop at Ca Mau for fuel. Circling the thick cloud roof, we finally found a hole and dove straight through it and landed with only 20 minutes of fuel left.
Pedro91 over Ca Mau and low on fuel
DAVID30; I was also in contact with Thunderbird Chief the flight leader of a heavy fire team (3 UH-1D Gunships) who had been scrambled to support the rescue effort and was enroute to the outpost. I asked his fuel state and was told it was 800 lbs departing Ca Mau. Knowing this would permit only 15 minutes at Nam Can I advised him to return to Ca Mau and top off with fuel.
When I arrived in the target area, I closely checked the positions where I had found VC strong points on 18 June. While I could see several freshly made, well constructed VC bunkers and four sampans I did not draw any ground fire nor did I see any VC. I could see the two American crew members on the helipad but I was not sure of their physical condition.
With Thunderbird Flight and Pedro91 refueling at Ca Mau, I decided to sneak Pedro39 in for a quick-up. I was confident the VC were concentrated south of the river. I elected to clear Pedro39 in to the outpost without delay and without fire suppression in an effort to utilize surprise. I selected an approach path for the rescue attempt, directed Pedro39 to approach from the north and marked the IP with a smoke rocket. I told him to start down from 2500 feet at this smoke and marked a point on the river by the outpost where he was to turn into the wind toward the helipad.
Capt Don VanMeter (RCP) Pedro39; The airborne FAC did not inform us of the full extent of the opposition. We did know there had been an attack on the Fort the night before and obviously the ability to down the FAC we were sent to rescue. I was informed that some Army UH1 Gunships were en-route to assist with fire support. After a discussion with DAVID30, I started the approach as the O-1 FAC fired a smoke rocket to mark the IP. We made a high speed diving approach from the north as if that was the place for the pick-up and then at about 30 ft altitude and 70 knots indicated, I made a low level turn to the east and a dash to the landing area in front of the Fort from the west. We had the “Loud Hailer” speakers on and told the two Americans to board. They were standing in a gate about 30 feet to our left and the U.S. Marine officer was talking with some Vietnamese officers at the Fort. Less than a minute later we had three mortar rounds bracket us; one in front, one on the right and one behind.
Capt. Tom Precious (RCCP) Pedro39; as I recall, VanMeter was the pilot of the bird I was on. This was my first mission in country. When we landed on the pad, all these civilians came running at us. Then I saw this water spout out in the middle of the river. Thought it was odd that a whale would swim up this far!!!! Don saw it too, and started to pull collective. We got out of there and had to go refuel.
Editors Note: Unknown to both pilots, as the Huskie landed, (FE) Bernie “Touch” Touchette deplaned to lead the two Americans safely into the aircraft. As the first 3 mortars bracketed Pedro39, Bernie spun around, dove back in the cabin, landing on his belly as the Huskie lifted from the pad.
Capt Don VanMeter (RCP) Pedro39; Knowing the sequence of mortar fire I knew the next rounds would be corrected to blanket the area we were in. No choice but a very quick departure; I exceeded just about every red line on the gauges. There was not sufficient fuel to make another attempt or wait for the Army UH1's. We returned to the district landing strip at Ca Mau and as we taxied into the parking area the engine flamed out.
DAVID30; When the H-43 landed, I came under intense ground fire and estimated the volume of fire from more than 20 automatic weapons plus small arms. I took one round through the cockpit. While I have received a lot of ground fire in my tour this was the best fire disciplined I have seen. The volume of fire could not have been from a unit smaller than a heavy weapons company. This rescue attempt would have been successful except that the crew to be picked up ran for a bunker rather than get aboard the helicopter. I told Pedro39 to get out of there and go to Ca Mau because I would not consider another attempt without strong fire suppression on the south bank.
I had requested two flights of F-100 aircraft very early, it was 40 minutes before a flight was scrambled in support of the rescue operations. The fighters were needed to suppress the massive enemy AAA fire. This lengthy delay in getting tactical air was beginning to complicate the overall rescue effort. I was now faced with the alternatives of either delaying the recovery or conducting the rescue under cover of an air attack, but without the gunships that would have to return for fuel or to act immediately and suppress fire with the gunships and conduct the rescue amid enemy fire that I knew could not be fully suppressed without tactical air. To add another element of uncertainty to these two unattractive alternatives, I could see the crashed aircraft was upside down and I was not sure whether the occupants required medical aid. I thus elected to proceed immediately and suppress with the Thunderbirds.
Thunderbird Chief advised me that he had two 25 minute smoke pots that are normally used to mark landing zones prior to an airmobile troop insertion. We elected to use them. He made one pass down the south bank of the river and put out the two smoke pots in an effort to screen the rescue effort from the Viet Cong on the south side of the river. He and I drew heavy automatic weapon fire as he made this pass. One of the smoke pots ignited and one did not which provided at best minimal screening for the extraction, but after quickly talking the situation over we chose to proceed.
EDITORS NOTE: extracted from a Pacific Stars & Stripes article; There was just enough fuel left for 15 more minutes over Nam Can, not enough time to wait for an airstrike. It would be now or, maybe, never! As Conover pulled into sight, David30 decided to gamble. He asked the T-Birds if they would try to provide suppressive fire long enough for another rescue attempt and Thunderbird Chief said they'd try. David30 then asked Pedro91 if he'd go in. The helipad was still being splattered with mortars. "If the T-Birds cover, we're game." OK, it was set. Swooping in low the T-Bird Huey dropped two smoke bombs.
Pedro91 swoops in for the 1st try
Capt. Larry Conover (RCP) Pedro91; I followed DAVID30’s instructions making a steep approach down to the helipad.
Capt. Bill Haugen (RCCP) Pedro91; we arrived in the target area and were advised by an airborne FAC to attempt a pickup at the helipad. On the way in we received automatic weapons fire and could see mortar rounds impacting around the outpost. We landed on the helipad but the aircrew was not there. While we were on the helipad mortar rounds impacted around us; the VC seemed to have the helipad zeroed in. We departed the immediate area, zigzagging to hopefully present less of a target.
SGt. Bill Crawford (FE) Pedro91; my memories differ slightly from other Crewmembers. I can only attribute this to the fog of war and the 39 year lapse trying to remember details. During the first landing, I remember the sweat stained FAC running up to our aircraft, clutching an armful of maps and checklists. As he reached the cabin door, I grabbed and pull him in. I distinctly remember him flying across the cabin and striking his head on the opposite side of the aircraft.
DAVID30; The second plan involved the approach of Pedro91 from the north breaking east into the helipad on the north bank, coordinated with the Thunderbirds approaching from the north to a point 600 meters east of the target laying down heavy suppressive fire on the VC position and breaking west down the south bank and attempting suppression of the AAA while I circled the Viet Cong guns synchronizing the effort. When the first attempt was made in this manner, both the gunships and I received heavy automatic weapons fire and the Viet Cong hit the heliport with another mortar barrage.
DAVID30; on the second attempt we used the same tactic and the Thunderbirds again laid down superb machine gun and rocket cover fire to screen the rescue effort. The helipad was again mortared and all the aircraft again came under intense ground fire. The Marine Lieutenant Colonel wanted to get five wounded Vietnamese aboard. I did not know there was wounded Vietnamese there and there was not enough room in the tiny Huskie to bring them out.
Capt. Bill Haugen (RCCP) Pedro91; we attempted another pickup and landed near the outpost. Knowing that they would be overrun by the VC that night, 50 or more ARVN soldiers and their families near the outpost suddenly rushed us and tried to get aboard our helicopter. This would have badly overloaded us and we would not have been able to get airborne. Our PJ and FE kept them out while we lifted into a low hover. [In this confusion I think that an ARVN Interpreter who had flown in on our helo was pulled out – but this may be incorrect.] We continued to receive mortar fire which increased the panic factor for the ARVN around our helo.
Bill Crawford (FE) Pedro91; we were swarmed by ARVN soldiers and their dependents trying to climb onboard. (PJ) Jerry Pearson and I fought hair, tooth and nail, punching and kicking to keep this mob out of the aircraft. In the confusion, an ARVN Interpreter who had flown in with us was pushed out of the cabin door and a wounded ARVN soldier managed to scrambled in.
Bill Haugen (RCCP) Pedro91; Larry lifted into a low hover and I remember looking over on his side of the cockpit and outside his door was an ARVN desperately hanging onto the front gear strut. He then spun the aircraft and shook off the unwanted passengers from an altitude of six feet.
DAVID30; we made a third effort synchronized as before and were successful this time. The helipad was again mortared and all aircraft involved again received intense ground fire.
Capt. Bill Haugen (RCCP) Pedro91; I don’t remember how many attempts we made at a pickup, three maybe? At some point we picked up one of the downed O-1 aircrew. However the other one was not coming to the helo; but we could see him moving around near the outpost. I used our “Loud-Hailer” (a PA system on the front of the helo) to tell him to move quickly to a designated location well away from us and we would come back and pick him up. Larry ground-hovered just out of the reach of the panicked mob below us. He drew the crowd to the opposite side of the clearing, then in one quick maneuver, swung the aircraft back in front of the Outpost gate where LtC Culpepper was standing.
Capt. Larry Conover hover-taxies, drawing the mob away from LtC Culpepper
Bill Crawford (FE) Pedro91; as we flew back and landed near the Fort, I jumped from the door, dashed over, grabbed the Marine and forcibly pushed him towards the aircraft, then into the cabin. I was determined that he was coming this time because I knew we wouldn’t survive a 4th try.
Capt. Bill Haugen Pedro91; I have never seen so many mortar rounds explode near me, and hope I never do again. At one point I saw what looked to be an 82 mm mortar impact very close to our aircraft. The only thing that saved us was that the mortar exploded in a small stream beside us, and the bank of the stream protected us while shrapnel went up over the rotor blades.
Pedro91 coming out Mission Complete
DAVID30; as Conover flew away, it was over. The helicopters disappeared toward Ca Mau. The Pedro crews displayed great courage and determination to succeed when they would not have been criticized for declining to enter the inferno of fire until multiple tactical airstrikes had been put on the Viet Cong positions. It is truly reassuring for me to see the dedication to duty and their willing acceptance of great risks on the part of these men, in their unarmed Huskies.
Blade05 with a little “pay-back”
AFTERMATH: Shortly after this rescue operation was completed, I expended two flights of F-100s (Blades 03 with 8 - 750lb bombs and 20mm and Blade 05 with 4 - 500lb Hi-Drag bombs, 2 Lau-3 rocket pods, 2 CBU-2 and 20mm). These flights saturated the area where I had observed one mortar to be located and where most of the automatic weapon and tracer fire had come from. This area was simply devastated by the bombs and strafing. The mortar position was hit by the first 750lb bomb and five other bunker weapon positions were destroyed. Two more flights of F-100s and a flight of A-1Hs were later expended in the area to neutralize other hostile strong points.
The Vietnamese interpreter who was on the ground during this action and that night told me the next morning that the wounded Viet Cong could be heard screaming with pain all throughout the night. The hostile unit was reported as the U-Minh II Battalion of Viet Cong reinforced by a heavy weapons company. There is little doubt that they were badly crippled as a fighting unit.
When VNAF helicopters went into the area the following morning to bring out the ARVN wounded they did not draw a round of ground fire.
PEDRO39
(RCP) Donald VanMeter DFC
(RCCP) Tom Precious DFC
(FE) Bernie “Touch” Touchette DFC
(PJ) James Parks DFC
PEDRO91
(RCP) Larry Conover SS
(RCCP) Bill Haugen DFC
(FE) Bill Crawford DFC
(PJ) Jerry Pearson DFC